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A REVIEW OF IN-FLIGHT EMERGENCIES
IN THE ASKS DATA BASS.
by
Richard F. Porter
SUMMARY
I
	
	 This report describes a series of 154 in-flight emergencies as reported
to the Aviation Safety Deporting System. The various types of emergencies
i 
are examined and an attempt is made to determine the Duman errors and other
factors associated with each incident, as well as the measures taken to
resolve the emergency. It is concluded that near1 , ^ one <<,,lf of those Lhmer-
genci:es reported were related to failure or malfunction of aircraft subsys-
tems. Of all the emergencies, nearly one quarter were associated with
power-plant failure. Other frequently-encountered emergency types are asso-
ciated with operation in Instrument Meteorological Conditions without
appropriate clearance or nual.ification, and with low fuel.-state situations.
Human error is prominently featured in many of the incidents, appearing in
the actions of dilots and air traffic controllers.
INTRODUCTION
An analysis of information transfer problems in emergency air-ground
communications has recently been completed, based upon the reports in the
ASKS files. A prerequisite to that analysis was the extraction of ASKS
reports which describe an in-flight emergency. Approximately one-third of
the emergency occurrences were usable in that they contained an identifiable
post—emergency problem related to a communication dysfunction.
i
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This report presents the results of a broader examination of the com-
plete set of previously extracted in-flight emergency reports. Attention line
been given to an exposition of the factors significant to the emergencies
themselves, without being limited to those associated with a communication
problem.
OBJECTIVE
The objectives of this study were: (1) to describe the types of in-
flight emergency occurrences appearing in the reports in the ASRS files; (2)
to define the system .factors, human errors, and associated cause3 of these
emergencies; and (3) to define the manner in which they were resolved, as
appropriate for each case.
SCOPE
This study it confined to the group of reports extracted from the ASKS
files for a previous analysis entitled "Information Transfer Problems in
Emergency Air-Ground Communications." The reports were extracted from over
14,000 reports submitted between May 1978 and September 1980. The search
strategy employed is that study is described in the following section; but,
in essence, it sought to extract those reports which describe a distressful
situation which either led to a declared emergency, or was similar in cir-
cumstances to other incidents in which an emergency was declared.
The Air Traffic Control Handbook (FAA, 7110.65A 1550) describes an elder-
gency as "... any situation which places an aircraft in danger; i.e., uncer-
tainty, alert, being lost, or in distress." A standard dictionary specifies
an unforeseen combination of circumstances that calls for immediate action to
avoid disaster. Both of these definitions are broader in scope than that
which is implicit in the group of reports used in this study.
None of the incidents used in this study deal with the types of sudden
crisis situations in which recovery is immediately achieved by a more or less
2
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reflex action on the part of the flight crew,
	
Examples of the excluded
situations are near mid-air collisions, wake vortex encounters, turbulence
r
	 upsets, and others in which there is sufficient time for a conscious choice
of optional courses of action.
The incidents used in this study are restricted to those in which a
declaration of emergency was appropriate, whether or not such a declaration
was actually made. They are characterized by a relatively prolonged period
of distress and a demand for air crew procedures or ATC handling beyond the:
ordinary.
APPROACH
As mentioned previously, the data base for this study was the group of
reports extracted from the ASRS files for a recently completed analysis of
information transfer problems in emergency communications. Although no addi-
tional search was conducted for the current study, the search strategy for
the earlier analysis is outlined below.
r
	
	 The initial screening consisted of a search
trained the word "emergency" in any phrase in any
y	 Factors, Associated Factors, Recovery Factors,
Descriptors) utilized in the ASKS system.
duplicate reports of the same incident or for
unsuitable, the initial screening yielded 131 di;
for all reports which con-
of the five fields (Enabling
Supplementary Factors, and
Following an examination for
others which were deemed
acrete emergency situations.
The next step was to expand the sample by examining the 131 reports to
identify other descriptive phrases with a relatively high frequency of
occurrence or which, intuitively, might be useful in finding other pertinent
study cases even though the word "emergency" did not occur in a descriptor.
Table 1 Lists the key descriptors that were selected, other than those
explicitly containing the word "emergency".
Excluding the reports previously examined, it was found that at least
one of the descriptors in Table 1 appeared in 850 reports in the data base.
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TABLE 1. DESCRIPTORS USED IN REPORT SELECTION
Situation Descriptor
Low Fuel fuel Remaining
Eo8ine xnfl.ight Engine Shutdown
Engine Problem
Aircraft Engine-Out, Performance
Aircraft Equipment Problem/Engine
Power Plant Problem
.Engine Control Problem
Aircraft Equipment Operating
Problem/Engine
xnfliglit Fire
Weatbur 1MC in VrR Plight
Weather In Terminal Area
Weather Forecast
Weather Report
Weather Avoidance
VFR on Top
)nroute Weather
Landing Precautionary Landing
Return/Land
Off Airport Landing
Pressurization Aircraft Equipment Problem/
Pressurization
Cornmaund Authority Command Authority
Disorientation Disorientation
Spatial Disorientation
Mi.scellanoous Blind Broadcast
Sensory Illusion
Lo g s of AircrzaCt Control
4
vFrom these, 37 were judged to qualify as emergency situations.
Combining the 131 cases from the first search with the 37 additional
cases produced a total of 168 emergency incidents which formed the basic data
set for the study of related information transfer problems.
For the current study, with emphasis on the emergency situations them-
selves, the data se*, was .further reduced to 154 discrete incidents by elim-
inating those which did not contain sufficient information to classify the
nature of the emergency.
The analysis consisted of an initial classification of each emergency by
type, followed by a careful review of the report narratIves in an attempt too-
(1) idrntiy the basic reason that the emergency developed, and (2) to take
note of the manner in which the difficulties were resolved.
RESULTS
The 154 cases can be segregated into two basic types: (1) those related
to a physical failure of an aircraft subsystem, and (2) those that are not.
Table 2 lists the 154 emergency cases by type.
Each of the emergencies was examined with regard to the causal factors
and noteworthy recovery .factors. These are described in the following para-
graphs.
Aircraft Systems Emergencies
The broad nature of the enabling, or causative, factors for each of the
74 aircraft systems emergencies is given in Table 3.
Almost half of the emergencies in Table 3 were caused by a failure of
the ,aircraft's propulsion system. Eighteen of the 34 incidents occurred with
multi-engine aircraft and were resolved largely by priority treatment from
ATC.	 The remaining 16 failures occurred on singlo-engine aircraft, and six
5
TABLE 2. TOTAL POPULA'T'ION OF EMERGENCY SIx1ATION5
Type No. of Cases
Percent
Total Emergencies
Aircraft Systems Emergencies
Propulsion 34 22.08
Pressurization 12 7.79
Electrical 7 4.5$
Landing Gear/Tires 6 3.90
Hydraulic 5 3.25
Flight Control 4 2.60
Airframe 3 1.95
Fire WMWIE 1.30
Smoke/Fumes, Unspecified Cause 1 0.65
Subtotal 74 48.05
Emergencies Nor_rny_Ulyina
Aircraft Systems
VFR Pilot in IMO, 32 20.78
Low Fuel State 27 17.53
Severe Weather Avoidance 8 5.19
Lost 6 3.90
Illness on Board 2 1.30
Miscellaneous 5 3.25
;uhtotal 80 51.95
Grand Total 154 100.00
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TABLE 3 NATURE OF ENABLING FACTORS FOR AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS I MERGENCXES
Type
Number of Cases
Machanical 1"ailuxe+
	 f ►uman Error	 BOER
Propulsion 30 3 1
Pressurization 12 0 0
Electrical 7 0 0
Landing Gear/Tires 5 1 0
Hydraulic 5 0 0
Plight Control 3 1 0
Airframe 3 0 0
Fire 'Warning 2 0 0
Smoke/Fumes 1 0 0
Totals 68 i	 5 1
of these consisted of a total loss of power. oddly enough, only two cul-
minated in art off-airport landing; the remaining four were within gliding
distance of an airport.
Next in frequency were failures in the cabin pressurization system,
requiring a rapid loss of altitude, often initiated prior to an appropriate
clearance.
Electrical problems created seven -mergencies. Five of these were
resolved by landings with no radio contact with ATC, one of which required a
small twin to execute a low-altitude visual approach in instrument meteoro-
logical conditions. Other electrical failures nausea the emergency lending
of a three-engine wide-body transport after loss of instrumentation, and the
emergency evacuation of an air taxi aircraft after landing roll-out because
of smoke in the cabin.
7
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Landing Soar and tire failures contributed six incidents. Two cases of
tire failure on takeoff were reported for air carriai- airetaft. in one ) the
takeoff was aborted, the passengers evacuated, and a small fire extinguished
by the fire crow. In the second, axtenrl ,, P. landing Soar damage to a, four-
angina heavy transport was caused by blown tires on takeoff, requiring an
emergency landing on a foamed runway. Minor Innding damage was Also suffered
by a small aircraft whose right main guar would not fully extend, by an air
carrier aircraft whose right wain Sear would not fully extend, and by an air
carrier aircraft with a hanging landing Soar door. In the remaining two
cas*s t the Aircraft landed without further inctlent.
Hydraulic system failures resulted in amer6ency landings for four air-
craft: two air carrier aircraft and two military. In the remaining case of
hydraulic problems, leaking hydraulic fluid dripped on hot anSine parts of an
air carrier aircraft after landing, creating heavy smoke And causing an emer-
gency evacuation of the airplane.
Problems with the fli ght control s ysLem accounted for four amnergene"IM-70
In one ) as military fighror was given an emergency aloarance to return to base
after unspecified trouble with the control system. Two cases, involving an
air coxi light twin and a three-engine air carrier aircraft were particularly
dramatic and are discussed later. In the remaining incident, an aileron
boost malfunction restricted the right aileron control, movement oil a three-
engine air carrier aircraft after takeoff. The crew was able to execute a
left-turn pattern to return to the runway for landing.
Failures of the airframe itself were only three in number. A cracked
window panel on a corporate jet at 41,000 feet required an emergency descent,
but no deprevsurization was experienced. The att stair partially lowered in
flight on a three-engine air carrier airplane, while a military trainer
experienced airframe vibration of an unspecified nature; both required
expedited landings.
Fire warning lights initiated emergencies: with two military aircraft,
one a four-engine transport and the other a fighter. Both executed emergency
landings.
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The remaining aircraft system emergency concerned a orecautionary off-
airport landing of a military helicopter because of smoke and fumes of an
unspecified origin.
The immediate c , i ­ se of all 74 incidents in the aircraft systems emer-
gency group was, by definition, as failure of some component of the aircraft
or its subsystems to perform as expected. In most cases, that root cause of
the failure cannot be determined from a reading of tha submitted report, In
general., it is not possible to determine whether a design defect, a material
failure, improper operation, or faulty maintenance precipitated the failure.
There are exceptions, in watch a human error clearly caused or combined
with a system failure to create an emergency situation. These cases are dis-
cussed in the following paragraphs.
In three cases, a propulsion system failure can be clearly attributed to
the inexperience of the pilot. One of those cases combined inadequate train-
ing on the part of a student with coruendabl.e perception anal competence- on
the part of a controller:
"...After crossing Diablo Range mountains and reducing
RPM's to achieve a 200 ft/min descent, I noticed the
engine ;started running roughly. Applying full power to
Level off, the engine RPM dropped from 2004 RPM t 500
then back to about 1500 and the engine almost died. I
decided to get help and tuned in 121.5, ... Whoever
answered my call verified contact and then told me to
pull carb hent on. I did and the RPM gained to almost
normal and the engine ran smoother. The engine began
to run smoothly rind normally 4;nd alL gauges were in
green."
The second pilot-induced engine failure is apparently related to a
student's lack of familiarity with his aircraft;
"A small aircraft was on downwind turning base, when he
said 'T have a real problem'. lie would not answer any
further transmissions. tie made an emergency landing on
Taxiway C.
	
tie said he meant to turn off (sic) the
carburetor heat, but pulled the throttle instead. He
then pushed the throttle back in and the engine
apparently flooded out."
9
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The third p1lot-inducad engine problem was created by a more experienced
'L	
-
(164 hours) pilot of a small single-angina Aircraft:
"Turned of f anaine As scanning caught oil prescure drop-
ptng below 2 lbs. Oil tamp on pin. Declared amaigency
after setting up Slid* from 8200 ft.. resLart4d engine at
2300 - all appeared normal. Believe cause to be long
climb at 80 mph and too loan."
In one case, a mechanical problem combined with pilot error to create a
propulation system emergency. In this caoup the pilot (420 hours) continued
takeoff despite abnormal engine operation which was later attributed to con-
tamination in a fuel line:
%me rough...adjustad
to approximately 100
to settle..,angine
abort. No runway
road near and of
"Take off run started...angina, bec^
mixture 112 runway. Normal climb
feet ... end ofrunway plane 'began
became rough again... Decided to
left.,.Normal landing on sand Access
runway area."
The single case of a human-orror induced landing gear emergency occurred
after takeoff of an air carrier aircraft when the Gear-Unsafe and Gear-Door
Open lights illuminated as a result of the crew's failure to remove the right
main landing gear pin during preflight.
The remaining example of a clear human-error causal factor in an air-
craft systems emergency concerna the flight control system of a three-engine
air-carrier aircraft on a. scheduled passenger flight:
"The aircraft was towed from the hangar to the gate by
maintenance personnel.. 	 It had been worked on to comply
with a bulletin.	 Since hydraulics had been involved
(disconnected to allow work) items powered by hydraulics
were not all in normal configoration, (gear door-landing
edge devices, etc.) but not unusual, for having depres-
surized hydraulics and not yet pressurizing 'A' system.
All check lists were accomplished... Takeoff roll and
lift-off seemed normal. 	 Immediately after liftoff a
lateral control problem appeared (roll to right) requir-
ing about 15 to 20 degrees aileron and left rudders.. At
1660 ft going from flaps 5 to 2 degrees, a number of
compressor stalls occurred on number three engine. Power
immediately retarded to idle. Emergency declared to Bay
departure. Emergency check lists completed. Fuel dumped
10
(3000 pounds) (over water-bay) to raduce weight to land-
r
	
ing weight ... 30 degree flaps landing made without further
G
	
inrident. however, niter reducing power to idle on number
3 engine, lateral control became difficult, aircraft rol-
ling right. (About 90-95 percent aileron and aboL.t 75-80
percent rudder required for level fligh4.) After arriv-
ing at gate it was found that the right ground spoilers
were deployed (up). A check by maintenance found the
hydraulic lines (left wheel well.) to right inboard ground
spoilers had been reconnected in reverse position, caus-
ing ground spoilers to deploy, with speed brake handle
selected to down position."
The exemplary airmanship evident in the preceding narrative obviously
averted a major disaster. An examination of the recovery factors in the Air-
craft Systems Emergencies group reveals other Homeric recoveries by air
crews. Consider the case of the pilot of a twin-engine air taxi, whose con-
trol column became disconnected from the elevator surfaces:
1°... Passenger questioned me as to what the trim was for
and I told him to hold the controls while I put one full
turn up-trim as a demonstration. A loud trop was heard
and the aircraft pitched up. I tried to lower the nose
with elevator control but found that the control column
was no longer connected to the control surface. The air-
craft was just abut to stall. and as a la ps. ditch effort
I pulled the power off and tried the trim. I was able to
regain a safe attitude by jockeying the power and trim.
At this time I felt it prudent to declare an emergency.
... I carefully tried the controls and found all to be
working normally except the elevator. The only up-down
control I had was power and trim. ... I was able to land
the aircraft at DFW using power, trim, and rudder only.
I v;ns hesitant to use the aileron or otherwise fiddle
with a relatively controlled situation. Upon touchdown I
shut the engines and electrical system down so as to
eliminate as riany sources of ignition as possible. There
was no damage to the aircraft and no person was
injured..."
Other noteworthy recoveries are evident. The crew of a four-engine
wide--body transport executed a successful straight-in approach with three
engines stuck at idle thrust following a new fuel-saving slow descent from
u
cruise altitude. In another display of skill, the crew of a twin-engine air
carrier aircraft landed successfully with no pressure in either hydraulic
system; leaving them with limited control power, only 15 degrees of flap, no
11
spoilers, no nose-whael, steering, free-fall lowering of the landing gear, and
a one-.shot braking ability.
Emer encies Not Involvina Aircraft S stems Failure
The 80 cases in this second major grouping are incidents in which all
aircraft subsystems were functioning normally. An element of human Pr ►:or in
forecasting, planning, or execution is present in the majority of these; but
some are created by the p1lot's perception that lie cannot safely follow stan-
dard ATC procedures or controller directive.
1r, Tabla 4, this group is segregated into two distinct subsets: (1)
those in Fthich the aircraft was truly in distress; and (2) those in which the
declaration of an e4itergency was needed, in the pilot's opinion, to avoid a
potentially dangerous situation 'by disregarding controller instructions or by
seeking, priority handling.
TABLE 4. CLASSIFICATION OF EMERGENCIES NOT INVOLVING
AIRCRAFT SUBSYSTEM FAILURES
Number of Cases
Declaration For
Aircraft Actually Deviation From
Type of Emergency in Distress ATC Procedures
VFR i.,. ' MC 29 3
Low Fuel, State 19 8
Severe Weather Avoidance 0 8
Lost 6 0
Illness on Board 0 2
Miscellaneous 4 1
Totals 58 22
12
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Each type of emergency in Table 4 is treated separately in the following
1
paragraphs.
VFR in IMC
With regard to the VFR in IMC emergencies, the 29 cases in the first
column of Table 4 all involve non-instrument-rated pilots who were in instru-
ment meteorological conditions or were in imminent danger of being forced
into such conditions.
Five of the 29 arrived at their destination ""VFR on top." In two of
these, the narratives contain an implication that the subsequent let-down on
instruments could have been avoided. It may be conjectured that these two
incidents, at least, were not entirely inadvertent.
In the first of these, a 230 hour pilot arrived at his destination at
9500 feet, Vt''R on top of a solid overcast:
s
"... Center informed me that he had just finished (45
minutes ago) giving another VFR pilot vectors to find a
hole... I informed him that I had 4q hours of instrument
time and could easily descend through the overcast... so
li
	
	 then I declared emergency and he gave me clearance to
descend below the overcast. Less than five minutes later
I was flying under blue sky. A break in the
overcast... five miles in diameter or more. ... At the
time of the incident I had 2.5 hours of fuel on board..."
t
In the other case, a pilot with a degree in meteorology ignored a two
degree spread between temperature and dew point at his destination:
",•. Upon arrival at Wenatchee	 the	 stratus	 had	 become
overcast
	
with	 only	 a	 few thin spots.	 I felt it would
have been too dangerous to attempt penetration. 	 I called
Wenatchee	 FSS and ... refiled for a return to Felts field.
... Wenatchee FSS called: and reported that both Felt	 and
Spokane	 International	 had gone IFR.	 ... I advised them
9= that I was VFR rated pilot with 10 hours	 of	 logged	 IFR
instruction	 and 20 hours of total instrument and simula-
tor time ... I stated I felt comfortable staying	 in	 the
Wenatchee	 area
	
and	 making	 an approach through the 100
feet thick layer.
	
FSS acquired a VOR approach	 clearance
for me.	 I made a complete and successful approach break-
,
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ins out at 2500 feet, or 1200 AGL. ... The emergency was
not absolutely necassary nor the IFR approach. I could
have landed on farm road on the Badger Mountain. Plateau
north of Wenatchee. These are often used as emergency
landing practice runways...and were above the stratus
layer."
since all unintentional flight into IMC by non-instrument pilots
involves an error in judgement at some; point, an effort was made to classify
these incidents in some manner which would reveal the root cause of these
emergencies. This effort was not entirely successful, because of the fact
that eanh reporter related only the facts that he chose. Ten reporters cite
inaccurate terminal or enroute weather forecasts, but many mention: no weather
briefing at all. In the latter case ., it cannot be assumed that none was
received.
Some general types of errors are apparent. In some, the reporter
received a terminal area forecast but neglected to inquire about the enroute
conditions. Typical of these was an 87 hour pi.lrt on a flight from Kansas
City to Indianapolis:
11 ... received weather from St. Louis 1'SS ... Indianapolis
4000 scattered to broken, 4 miles in haze. I .failed to
ask f.)r Terre Haute (enroute) weather... At approxi-
mately Mattoon, Illinois (40 miles west of Terre Haute)
visibility and ceilings began to lower. Dropped down to
2500 MSL and attempted to call Mattoon Unicom - No answer
... lost VLA VOR about the same time as HUF VOR became
usable. As I continued the flight (I should have made
the 180 degree turn at this point - but didn't) the visi-
bility and ceilings became lower until I found myself
trapped at 1000 feet MSL..."
Another type of mistake evident in the reports is to receive a complete
briefing at departure but fail to keep current on enroute weather, even when
observation doesn't agree with the briefing. As an example, (from a 1000
hour pilot):
... As the cloud cover increased in density, the pilot
stayed on top thinking the condition was a local area
condition therefore not reported in the weather briefing.
The pilot did not call Chicago to verify the area condi-
tion. The pilot flew for an additional, 65 nautical
14
miles. Mien the cloud cover did not clear and his fuel
supply was what lie thought to be low, he called South
Bend .Approach Control and reluested radar vectors to
Goshen Airport.	 The pilot was told that Goshen Airport
was 309 feet..."
^' c
r^
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If th re is a common thread which binds many of these VFR pilot/weather
incidents together, it is evident in the narrative above. An optimism, often
unfounded, seems to prevail that an observed area of IMC is local and that
conditions will improve.	 This often erroneous assumption is particularly
t tempting when supported by a weather forecast. In ten of these incidents,
the reporter complained of an inaccurate enroute or terminal. forecast.
Despite observations at variance with the forecast weather, each continued to
a point where lie could no longer remain in VMC with the fuel remaining.
Tile three VFR/weather incidents in the second column of Table 4 differ
from the 29 in the first column in that the aircraft was never actually in
distress. In one, an instru +aent rated pilot initiated an emergency climb to
VMC conditions after unforecast IMC was encountered at 1909 feet, but before
an IFR clearance cou ld be obtained. Another pilot , encountering 1-3/4 miles
visibility (not .forecast) in the control zone of a non-tower airport, and
unable to get a radio response fxnm the FSS, exercised his emergency author-
ity to enter the control zone and landed without difficulty. In a somewhat
similar incident, the reporter's aircraft was on base leg in rapidly
deteriorating weather when the airport went below legal VFR minimums.
Low Fuel State Emergencies
The 27 low fuel state emergencies are categorized in Table 5. It may be
noted that one of those involved a faulty fuel gauge and therefore might have
been categorized as an aircraft systems failure.
As listed previously in Table 4, eight of these were judged to be
declarations of emergency to prevent a distressful situation rather than to
recover from an existing condition. however, since this interpretation is a
matter of judgement, all low-fuel emergencies are listed in Table 5.
15
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TABLE 5. CIRCUMSTANCES IN L014-FUEL EMERGENCIES
Events
Number of Cases
TotalAir Carrier Gen, Av. Mil.
Held Until fuel Critical 5 2 0 7
Total Fuel. Exhaustion 0 6 0 6
Held-Field Closed-Diverted 3 0 1 4
Arrived With Min. Fuel,
Could Not Hold 0 0 3 3
Critical Fuel. After Missed
Approaches 0 1 1 2
insufficient Fuel For
Destination 0 1 0 1
Inaccurate Fuel Gauge False
Alarm 0 1 0 1
Negligent Handling by ATC 0 0 1 1
Low Fuel, Uncertain of Position 0 1 0 1
Unspecified Fuel Problem 0 1 0 1
Totals 8 13 6 27
The most common problem is simply an excessive holding time at busy ter -
minals, which save rise to seven incidents. More insidious, apparently, from
an actual hazard standpoint, are the four cases in which the aircraft held to
a low fuel state only to have the field go below minimums, requiring diver-
sion to an alternate. An example is an incident involving a four-engine
heavy transport, described in the following narrative excerpt:
"... I elected to depart with an estimate of 16,600 lbs
for landing at ORD... We were given a hold at Capital
FL200 with an acceptable EFC. Reason for hold was ORD
was down to one runway, which was 14R and many C/B's
North, East and South. Nineteen thousand lbs of fuel
remained at this point. We were stepped down and brought
into Vains intersection 25 DME from ORD at 6,000 feet.
Weather at ORD and MKE worsened rapidly with heavy TRW's
reported all directions but west. Then a large C/B moved
in directly over O'Hare and the field closed. One half
turn more in the hold put us down to 13,000 lbs and I
L•.
,4
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requested an immediate radar vector to Rockford. RFD
ATIS was 1900 overcast, I mile, gusts 20, 75 degrees,
29-71. 1 made a localtzer back course ILS to 18 in
rapidly deteriorating weather and heavy rain. A call
moved in between the runway and the final approach fix.
I continued the approach at MDA, penetrated the cell and
eventually missed the approach, never seeing any form of
airport environment. I immediately declared an emergency
and asked for radar vectors to 36 ILS ...	 We were fuel
critical now.	 At or above 1000 feet we became contact,
and I elected to continue the approach manually, one dot
low. Circling was out of the question due to a black
cell off the north of the runway. I estimate the wind
over the fence at 10 to 20 knots with gusts to 30 on the
tail. Runway wet. Spoilers did not deploy on rear wheel
spinup and were extended manually with maximum braking
from touchdown and maximum rev all four. Braking action
was poor and we hydroplaned the entire length, stopping
50 to 100 feet from the end...6,000 lbs were remaining."
While all eight of the air carrier incidents involved holding at the
destination, half of the si-,%- military incidents occurred because the aircraft
arrived at the terminal area with insufficient fuel for n ►
 holding time*,
With regard to Ceneral Aviation, 6 of the 13 low-fuel emergencies
involved total fuel exhaustion, resulting in five off-airport emergency land-
ings. These were all cases of human error, ranging from miscalculated fuel
consumption to simple inattention to the fuel state. One, from a non-
instrument-rated pilot, combined poor fuel planning with an apparent disre-
gard for operating in IMC without an appropriate rating:
"This flight was to be a round trip from Dayton, Ohio to
Detroit. The weather forecast was for ceilings below
4000 feet and visibilities 3 to 5 miles, deteriorating as
a warm front came in from the south. ... The tempera-
tures were below freezing at Dayton, forecast to reach
low 40's with drizzle by the P.M. ... The first leg was
uneventful..., landing in I miles visibility during light
snow. We declined to refuel.— expecti.ng at least 0.9 hour
reserve. Prior to departing Detroit we made several
attempts to contact FSS, by phone, but were unable to
find an open line... Except for traces of rime ice we
picked up south of Salem VOR enroute to Toledo, all was
typical of a "scud run." Somewhere between Findlay and
Rosewood, the cloud cover became more obscured and the
visibility progressively deteriorated.	 Incredibly, we
did not contact FSS at Findlay (or for that matter, any
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ground stations)...	 Quite rapidly thereafter the
	 ground
visibility	 dropped	 below	 VFR	 minimums	 (l	 mile),	 we
entered moderate fog and built
	 up	 nearly
	 1/'4	 inch	 of
E crusty	 rime	 ice...	 z opted to continue south and up —
and enlisted the aid of Dayton
	 Approach.
	 Running
	
full
,. throttle	 gave.	 2500	 to	 2550	 RPM,	 95	 MPH
	
and slowly
resulted in positive climb...we were given vectors toward
the	 ILS	 24L at Dayton...	 We were vectored to intercept
the localzer, cleared for the approach
	
and	 cleared	 to
land.	 Just prior to crossing the OM at 2800 MSL we lost
all pottier...
	 V. broke out and made a
	 clean,	 full	 flap
off-airport landing in 10 inches of snow..."
	 l
Severe Weather Avoidance
All eight of the incidents in this category were an exercise of command
authority by the pilot to deviate from the clearances given by air traffic
control. Seven of these were air carrier aircraft while one was a commuter
aircraft. Six declared an emergency to avoid thunderstorms on their assigned
heading while two deviated from their assigned altitude, without clearance,
to escape severe turbulence.
Los t
Four of the six lost pilots were identified as student pilots. Three
were also handicapped by a language problem., and one was not within direct
range of any ground radio facility. Two of these emergencies resulted in
off—airport landings.
Illness on Board
Two incidents are reported in which emergency descents and landings were
executed by air carrier pilots because of suspected coronary attacks suffered
by passengers.
Miscellaneous Emergencies
Five incidents are classified as miscellaneous because they are unique
for their type.
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Somewhat surprisingly, only one incident contains airframe icing as the
primary cause of an emergency. Following a missed approach in IMC, a small
single-engine aircraft was unable to climb above 1000 feet over terrain, lost
its gyro vacuum system and ,airspeed indicator, and was vectored to an alter-
nate.
One of the strangest inride t8 ^ n s involved the pilaf of a small single-
engine aircraft who filed an IFR flight plan, by telephone, from an uncon-
trolled airport at night. Once airborne, he realized lie had forgotten to
bring along either a microphone or a flashlight. Squawking 7700 on his tran-
sponder, he attempted to return only to find that his landin g gear would not
extend.
	 Unable to find the circuit breakers with no flashlight, he executed
a wheels-up landing.
One incident was caused by the disorientation of an inexperienced
instrument rated pilot at night in low visibility, attempting an instrument
approach. lie was observed, far off the local.izer, by the local controller
who directed him to the runway.
In another incident, an air taxi pilot suffered vertigo on a 2-mile
:final with a 500 foot ceiling. After breaking off the approach he was vec-
tored beck for another attempt and landed after some difficulty in flying the
IhS.
Tile final incident in this category might have been included in the
"Severe Weather Avoidance" group because it contains the same element of con-
flict between the pilot's perception of an unsafe operation and the inflexi-
bility of a controller;
"... Noted approaching, dark clouds to the east of the
airport.	 After contacting tower received wind report of
100 degrees 25 knots, gusts to 32.. Attempted crosswind
landing. Used full left rudder to the stop with airspeed
at 80 mph. Was able to contact ground with right main
but unable to reduce speed without loss of control. Made
go around and requested permission to land on center
taxiway straight into wind 2000 feet long. Tower said
they 'were unable to approve landing without contacting
airport manger.' Nenrest other airports were east toward
bad weather...
	 Declared emergency...made approach 75
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dograes off runway heading, landed ,across runway and
rolled out on taxiway... After I declared the emergency
and was on Approach, tower would rat answer radio calla
and volunteered no wind reports or assistance... 11
DISCUSSION
Causal Factors
The most useful produce of this study would be a J%finitive assessment
of the underlying causes of each of the emergency incidents, with particulate
emphasis on human shortcomings and system deficiencies. Unfortunately for
our purposes, such information is usually contained in the ASKS reportu only
by implication, if at all. For example, out of the '74 incident i.nvel:ving a
failure of an aircraft system, only one can clearly be traced to a mainte-
nance error; while hive can definitely be ascribed to air crew deficiencies.
There is no hint as to the root cause of the remaining 68 systems emergen-
cies.
Iq the 80 incidents which did not'involve a failure of an aircraft sys-
tem, the underlying reason for the emergency also remains a matter of conjec-
ture in most r.a.ses.
In 29 of the cases involving a non--instrument pilot in IMC, the pilot
must assume the ultimate responsibility, although it is evident that more
reliable weather informatic-a might have precluded many of these incidents.
in a very few crises (2 or 3) there is a hint that the pilot deliberately
decided to exercisn his limited instrument training. In the bulk of tie
incidents•, however, the trap was sprung by a combination of inadequate (no
enroute weather) or inaccurate weather data together with an innate optimism
that the VMC; forecast will, turn out to be correct, even though the pilots
first-hand observations indicate otherwise.
The low-fuel-state emergency causal factors are not as easily deduced,
in many cases. In the 11 incidents which included extensive holding at the
destination, it appears that the fundamental problem was traffic saturation
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at the intended destination. When such congestion is tggravatad by
deteriorating weather, the need to divert after an extensive hold can create
A truly hazardous situation.
other low-fuel emergencies were clearly	 caused	 by	 pilot
deficiencies--usually by poor flight planning--but sometimes they must be
attributed to simple inattention to the fuel remaining.	 Perhaps eight
incidents can be placed in this group.
The eight emergencies related to severe weather avoidance were all
created by a combination of dangerous meteorological conditions, as perceived
by the pilot, and a reluctance on the part of a controller to permit a prompt
course or altitude change. In no case is it clear why the controller
appeared inflexible, although usually it may be surmised that traffic congea-
tion and controller workload were contributing factors.
All six of the emergencies created by lost pilots can be attributed to
pilot inexperience, while the two cases of illness on board the aircraft can
only be considered acts of God.
Recovery Factors
In most cases, the recovery from the emergency, once declared, is rela-
tively straight-forward. On the other hand, several of the recoveries were
effucted only through truly impressive feats of airmanship, particularly in
those incidents involving an aircraft systems failure. Some examples were
citad in the previous section.
It may be significant that in none of the reported incidents involving a
non-instrument ptiot in DIC is there any mention of difficulty in maintaining
control of the aircraft.	 While soma	 of 6those	 reporters	 mention	 specific
training	 experience towards	 on iat-,trument rating, the ASKS reports suggest
that the basic instument training required for the Private Pilot	 certificate
has literally been a life-saver.
NVA.-
CONCLUSIONS
A total of 154 reports, describing emergency incidents, were reviewed in
detail during the course of this study. Although a numerical break-down of
pertinent factors may not have rigorous statistical significance because of
the relatively small number of cases in soma subgroupings, the following con-
clusions are drawn:
1. Almost half of the ameri;encies involved a failure of the
aircraft subsy4tems, with the preponderance of failures
related to the aircraft's propulsion system. Propulsion
syszem failures account for over 22 percent of all the
emergency cases.
2. other types of emergencies which appear with relatively
high frequency are Caused by operation in instrument
meteorclogical conditions without an appropriate rating
or clearance (21 percent) and a low fuel state (18 per-
cent). No other type of emergency was numerically more
than b percent of the toted..
3. Considering all types of emergencies, at least one-third 	 •
can clearly be attr0uted to human error in flight plan-
ning or execution. Most of these are related to opera-
ti.on in IMC by non{-instrument ;p ilots and the low-fuel
emergencies reported in the General Aviation category.
t+. A failure of the Air Traffic Control system to provide
expeditious and safe clearances is implied in 24 cases
(about 16 percent of all emergencies). Most of these
failures created critical fuel. situations. The implied
cease of the^.&TC deficiency is traffic congestion, often
coupled with inclement weather,
5. The basic instrument training required for the Private
Pilot certificate may have been a crucial aid in recovery
for non--instrument pilots in 'IMC. None of the narratives
indicated a basic difficulty with aircraft control in
4Yjese emergencies.
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